Any time a toddler mistakenly shoots a friend or family member, a teen kills himself with a bullet, or a gunman commits a mass shooting. The topic of "smart gun" technology comes up in conversation. The idea stems from a 1995 report by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), which proposed a technology-based solution to minimize the number of police officers killed in gun grabs by assailants. President Barack Obama's latest message on gun violence contained concrete guidance on federal actions to encourage the implementation and commercialization of electronic gun-safety systems.
The
word "smart gun" has become a catch-all for all types of electronic
personalized safety technology in the mainstream press. The aim is to ensure
that its registered owner can only shoot a gun. However, the various situations
in which a gun might be fired improperly necessitate radically different safety
mechanisms. We provide the safest and the best gun safes for
your smart guns.
A
typical door lock metaphor is a helpful way to think about the different
technical approaches. The key serves as a unique identifier for each person.
The authenticator is the pin tumblers, which know the key inside the lock. The
latch also acts as a block. All electronic gun-safety systems must recognize
registered shooters, authenticate their credentials, and then release the block
on the firing mechanism.
The
performance constraints of the application environment and the physical constraints
of the weapon dictate how certain needs are met. These distinctions result in
distinct branches on the personalized-weapons technology family tree.
Can you hear me now, proximity sensors?
One
set of solutions can be traced back to a National Institute of Justice study
aimed at preventing police guns from being taken away during a close-quarters
battle. It proposed using Radio Frequency Identification to create a
token-based proximity sensor (RFID). Starting with Colt's 1996 pistol, a range
of working RFID prototype weapons has been demonstrated, including
Triggersmart, M-2000, and the Armatix iP1.
A
consumer wears a passive RFID tag, similar to those embedded in goods to deter
shoplifting, in the form of a badge, wristband, or ring. It's the "token,"
and in the front door metaphor, it's the key. It can be duplicated or exchanged
in the same way that a physical key can. It is the possession of the token, not
the identity of the token holder, that is essential.
The
gun includes a wireless RFID reader that acts as an authenticator. It sends a
signal to the RFID tag, causing it to respond with an embedded code. If a match
is found, the electromechanical components unblock the weapon firing mechanism,
and the gun resumes normal operation. The response time of these devices varies
depending on the electromechanical components used in the blocking system (for
example, servomotors, solenoids, and shape memory metals). Still, it is usually
less than half a second. The gun is designed to stay active as long as there is
a signal connection or, in some cases, as long as pressure sensors sense the
gun is being held.
If
the tag is too far away from the transmitter for it to self-activate and react,
it's like losing your front door key: the gun remains locked. For example, the
Armatix iP1 specifies a 15-inch range. If you try to spoof the transponder with
a signal that doesn't contain the unique code, it's like trying to use the
wrong key: it fits in the slot but won't turn because it is tumbler don't
match, and the gun stays locked down.
In
the upper photo, the RFID-type system of the gun is locked. The weapon is ready
to fire in the inset, with the firing mechanism no longer blocked, and a user's
tag (in the form of a ring) is close enough. CC BY-ND iGun Technology Corp
Various
designs obstruct the mechanical firing mechanism in various locations, ranging
from the trigger bar to the firing pin. Different technologies, such as
solenoid actuators, shape memory alloy-based parts, and even electronic firing
systems, can be used as a deadbolt to be released when an authentication device
is received. The specifics are proprietary to each product on the market and
represent design trade-offs in power consumption, component free space, and
response time.
During
a close-quarters confrontation, the proximity of the gun to the token is not an
utter determinant of rightful ownership. However, the technology is simple to
use, allows for quick weapon sharing among authorized users (i.e., partners),
and reliably disables a weapon if the officer is overpowered and the duty
weapon is taken.
Can I recognize you by your biometrics?
In
the house, the advantages of a token-based scheme in a street experience become
a liability. The approach's effectiveness depends entirely on the token's owner
protecting it so that refused users cannot access it. Guns used for home
protection, on the other hand, are more likely to keep the token and weapon
together to avoid any delays in the event of an attack. It can be fired by
someone who has both the token and the weapon.
The
second set of innovations arose in reaction to child-safe handgun legislation
passed in New Jersey and Maryland in the early 2000s, which was intended to
discourage the illegal use of personal firearms kept at home. Physical tokens are
no longer needed for biometric authentication systems. Instead, any approved
user's observable physical characteristic becomes the secret. It cannot be
copied, counterfeited, or otherwise transmitted without permission.
Fingerprints
have been the most common feature used in biometric systems to date.
Fingerprint detection is a primary mode of protection in Kodiak Arms
Intelligent and Safe Gun Technology's retrofit for rifles. If the fingerprint
is the secret, the sensor and pattern matching software is the pin tumblers in
these weapons that perform the authentication.
Capacitance
imaging of the fingerprint is the most commonly used sensor technology. The
difference in distance between the finger's ridges and grooves and the sensor
plate produces a distribution of electrical charge storage (capacitance) that
can be calculated in the sensor's array of conductor plates. Some fingerprint
sensors use pressure sensing to produce a digital pattern that represents the
print, while others use infrared (thermal) imaging.
The
sensor software must be trained to store appropriate patterns that can reflect
multiple approved users' fingers or different fingers from a single user. Any
pattern that does not fit within a certain tolerance is then rejected. The
sensor's resolution, the extent and orientation of the exposed digit, and
physical factors that can interfere with the mapping all affect the
authentication process's reliability. Moisture on the finger, for example, can
fool a capacitive detector; cold fingers can make thermal imaging less
reliable; and dirt, paint, or gloves can mask the fingerprint beyond
recognition.

No comments:
Post a Comment